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现代公司的股东往往会通过构建复杂的股权结构关系来隐藏其对公司享有实际控制权的身份,并通过利用其他非正式的资源,如与政府之间的关系等,尽可能地采取各种手段增加他们的隐蔽性和掠夺性。本文采用定性的研究方法,将政治关联分为强、弱两个程度,将制度环境分为正式和非正式的,通过研究二者不同类型之间的匹配和互动关系,从而得出政治关联在不同的制度环境下是如何帮助实际控制人获得控制权的。经研究,本文得出以下结论:第一,当企业处于正式的制度环境之中时,无论政治关联的强度如何,都无法帮助实际控制人获得控制权,此时政治关联对于控制权的获得是无效的;第二,当企业处于非正式的制度环境中,而控制人所拥有的政治关联强度较强时,此时控制人所拥有的政治关联对于帮助控制人实现对公司的控制是积极、主动的,作用是明显的;第三,当企业处于非正式的制度环境中,而实际控制人所拥有的政治关联强度较弱时,实际控制人只能借助其拥有的政治关联实现对企业的控制发挥较小作用,此时政治关联只是起到辅助作用。
Shareholders in modern companies tend to hide their identity as companies have practical control over the structure of the complex ownership structure and, by using other informal resources, such as the relationship with the government, Increase their covert and predatory nature. This paper uses qualitative research methods, the political association is divided into strong and weak two levels, the institutional environment is divided into formal and informal, through the study of the two different types of matching and interaction, which leads to political relevance How to help the actual controller gain control in different institutional environments? After the research, this paper draws the following conclusions: First, when the enterprise is in a formal institutional environment, it can not help the actual controller to gain control regardless of the intensity of the political connection. At this time, the political connection obtains the control right Second, when the enterprise is in an informal institutional environment and the political connection strength possessed by the controller is strong, the political connection owned by the controller at this time is positive for helping the controller to control the company. Active, the role is obvious; Third, when the enterprise is in an informal institutional environment, and the actual controller has a weak political relationship, the actual controller can only use their own political affiliation to achieve the enterprise Control plays a smaller role, at a time when political affiliations play a supporting role.