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公共服务部门为社会提供公共服务产品,具有和私人产品部门完全不同的特点和激励结构,因此公共服务部门的改革面临着更复杂的问题。本文基于不完备合约理论,通过一个简单的公共服务部门所有权激励模型发现:私有制的公共服务部门更努力地减少运行成本,具有生产效率;国有制的公共服务部门则在公共服务的产量上具有优势,能够实现公共服务的有效供给;同时,对于国有制的公共服务部门来说,增加其自由裁量权(或剩余控制权)可以有效地激励公共服务部门降低成本、提高公共服务的质量。
The public service sector provides public service products to society and has quite different characteristics and incentive structures from those of the private product sector. Therefore, the reform of the public service sector faces more complex issues. Based on incomplete contract theory, a simple model of ownership incentive of public service sector found that the public service sector of private ownership harder to reduce operating costs and produce more efficiency; and the state-owned public service sector has an advantage in the output of public services At the same time, for the state-owned public service department, increasing its discretion (or residual control right) can effectively encourage the public service department to reduce costs and improve the quality of public service.