本文运用委托-代理模型,分析抽样检验与信息系统控制对供应链质量管理的影响和作用。传统的抽样检验尽管能有效提升产品质量,控制供应商的机会主义行为,但是作为一种事后的控制,无法弥补机会成本的损失,基于供应链信息系统的质量控制能有效地补充传统抽样检验的不足,实现供应链整体收益的帕累托改进。 This paper uses the principal-agent model to analyze the impact and role of sampling inspection and information system control on the quality management of supply chain. Although the traditional sampling inspection can effectively improve product quality and control the opportunist behavior of suppliers, as an ex post control, it cannot compensate for the loss of opportunity cost. The quality control based on the supply chain information system can effectively supplement the traditional sampling inspection. Insufficient to achieve Pareto improvement in the overall benefit of the supply chain.