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中央政府对地方政府的社会保障转移支付制度是在分税制的基础上实行的在社会保障领域内的一种财政分配方式和财政调节制度,是强化中央政府社会保障宏观协调能力的重要手段。中央政府与地方政府符合博弈关系中理性经济人和追求利益最大化的假设前提;中央政府与地方政府掌握的社会保障供给和需求方面的信息不对称,为二者之间博弈行为的发生提供了充足的空间;社会保障转移支付制度的基本特征也决定了中央政府与地方政府之间的可博弈性。本文的主要任务是运用博弈论的思想和信息经济学的理论,分析社会保障转移支付中地方政府之间以及中央政府与地方政府之间的博弈关系。通过对社会保障转移支付博弈模型以及对纳什均衡解的分析发现,改变社会保障转移支付的博弈规则,可以影响政府间博弈的均衡战略。建立并完善中央政府对地方政府的社会保障转移支付制度,关键是要完善政府间社会保障转移支付的博弈规则。
The transfer payment system of social security by the central government to local governments is a kind of fiscal distribution system and fiscal adjustment system in the social security field based on the tax distribution system. It is an important means to strengthen the macro-coordination ability of social security of the central government. The central government and the local government conform to the hypothesis hypothesis that the rational economic man and the pursuit of the maximization of interest in the game relationship. The information asymmetry in the social security supply and demand mastered by the central and local governments provides the game behavior between the two Sufficient space; the basic characteristics of social security transfer payment system also determines the game between the central government and local governments. The main task of this paper is to use the theory of game theory and information economics to analyze the game relationship between local governments in the social security transfer payment and between the central government and local governments. Through analyzing the game model of social security transfer payment and the analysis of Nash equilibrium, it is found that changing the game rules of social security transfer payment can affect the equilibrium strategy of intergovernmental game. The key is to establish and perfect the social security transfer payment system of the central government to the local government. The key is to improve the game rules of the transfer payment of the intergovernmental social security.