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运用罗宾斯泰英的轮流叫价谈判模型对碳排放权价格的形成进行分析,得出如下结论:碳排放权价格的唯一子博弈精炼纳什均衡结果取决于碳排放权买卖双方的耐心程度。而耐心程度取决于碳排放权的相对稀缺程度、流动性、碳排放权交易达不成时买卖双方的损失、碳排放权买卖双方的实力。在此基础上,探讨改善我国碳排放权价格劣势地位的策略。
The analysis of the formation of carbon rights price using the Robbinstein-Britain round-robin negotiation model leads to the following conclusion: the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium result of the carbon emission right price depends on the patience of the buyers and sellers of carbon rights. The degree of patience depends on the relative scarcity of carbon emission rights, liquidity, carbon emissions trading failed to reach both the loss of both buyers and sellers, carbon emission rights both the strength of buyers and sellers. On this basis, we discuss the strategy of improving the inferior position of China’s carbon emission right.