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本文以2000—2012年16家上市银行为样本,实证分析了特许权价值、公司治理及其交互作用对银行稳健性的影响。研究结果表明:特许权价值存在自律效应;第一大股东性质和持股比例对银行稳健性没有显著影响,前十大股东的持股比例对银行稳健性有显著影响;董事会的监督管理能提高银行稳健性,而独立董事并没有起到应有的监督管理作用;高管持股能够增强银行稳健性,而高管薪酬却没有激励作用;银行规模和稳健性之间存在正相关关系,这也支持了“大而不倒”的观点;上市银行的杠杆效应没有充分发挥作用;特许权价值与前十大股东的持股比例、高管持股对于银行稳健性的影响起到相互替代作用。
In this paper, 16 listed banks from 2000 to 2012 as a sample, empirical analysis of the franchise value, corporate governance and its interaction on the bank’s robustness. The results show that there is a self-regulatory effect on the value of franchise. The nature of the largest shareholder and its shareholding ratio have no significant effect on the bank’s robustness. The ownership proportion of the top ten shareholders has a significant effect on the bank’s robustness. The supervision and management of the board of directors can be improved The stability of the bank, and independent directors did not play the proper role of supervision and management; the holding of senior executives can enhance the bank’s robustness, but executive compensation has no incentive; there is a positive correlation between bank size and robustness, which But also support the view that “big and not fall”; the leverage effect of listed banks did not fully play a role; franchise value and the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders, the impact of executive holdings on the bank’s stability played a mutual Alternative effect.