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对政府官员的问责需要合理使用奖惩措施。与其他威权体制一样,中国的党和政府在处理渎职官员时也面临着两难困境:无原则的容忍会削弱政权的合法性,而对涉事官员的惩戒则会影响政府官员的士气并给政府带来损失。由于这种两难困境,选择性或有区别的惩戒就成为合乎逻辑的选择。通过对社会冲突事件的案例分析,本文揭示了选择性惩戒背后的政治原则。研究发现,两个关键因素影响着在社会冲突事件中对处置失当的官员的惩戒:政府官员的过失行为所造成后果的严重程度,以及他(她)在过失行为中的角色。
Accountability to government officials requires the proper use of rewards and punishments. Like other authoritarian regimes, the Chinese party and government also face dilemmas in handling dereliction officers: a lack of principles will weaken the legitimacy of the regime, while the punishment of officials involved will affect the morale of government officials and give the government Bring loss. Because of this dilemma, selective or discriminatory disciplinary measures become logical choices. Through the case analysis of social conflicts, this article reveals the political principles behind selective punishment. The study found that two key factors affected the punishment of mismanaged officials in social conflicts: the seriousness of the consequences of negligence by government officials and his or her role in fault.