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虽然在大多数情况下完全竞争优于完全垄断,但是如果发生了市场失灵,对社会来说完全垄断就优于完全竞争。为此,本文从市场结构角度探讨碳污染外部性的福利效果,重新考察庇古税和科斯定理作用的约束条件。虽然我们依据完全竞争市场与负外部性会得到产生过多污染的结论,其解决方法是征收等于外部性的边际社会成本的税收,但这并不适用于不完全竞争市场,甚至是错误的。这样,从负外部性角度看,我们发现不竞争市场可能产生高于或低于社会最优水平的产出和碳污染,虽然通过征税让企业负外部性内部化,竞争性市场的产量就是社会最优的水平,但这并不适合不完全竞争市场。因此,我们需要将市场势力、产权和庇古税有机结合起来,才能更现实地解决负外部性问题。
Although perfect competition is superior to perfect monopoly in most cases, a complete monopoly on society is better than perfect competition in the event of market failure. Therefore, this article discusses the welfare effect of carbon pollution externality from the perspective of market structure and reexamines the constraints of Pigou tax and Coase theorem. Although our conclusion based on perfectly competitive markets and negative externality would be too much pollution, the solution is to impose taxes equal to the marginal social costs of externalities, but this does not apply to an imperfectly competitive market or even wrong. In this way, from the perspective of negative externality, we find that the non-competitive market may produce output and carbon pollution above or below the social optimal level. Although the internalization of the enterprise’s negative externalities through taxation, the output of the competitive market is Socially optimal level, but this is not suitable for imperfectly competitive market. Therefore, we need to organically combine market forces, property rights and Pigovian taxes so that we can more realistically solve the problem of negative externalities.