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研究了委托人与代理人双边过度自信倾向及风险厌恶偏好情形下的委托-代理问题.结论表明最优风险分担水平随着委托人风险厌恶程度及代理人过度自信水平的增大而增加,随着代理人风险厌恶程度和委托人过度自信水平的减少而减少.最优努力水平随代理人风险厌恶程度及委托人过度自信水平的增大而提高,随委托人风险厌恶程度和代理人过度自信水平的减少而减少.
The principal-agent problem with bilateral overconfidence and risk aversion preference is studied.The conclusion shows that the optimal risk sharing level increases with the degree of client risk aversion and the overconfidence level of agents, The degree of risk aversion and the decrease of overconfidence level of the principal decrease.The optimal level of effort increases with the risk aversion of the agent and the overconfidence level of the principal.With the degree of risk aversion of the principal and overconfidence of the agent, Reduce the level of reduction.