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数年来人们一直在积极考虑协调遥感活动的国际规约问题。看来联合国难以达成一致协议的主要障碍是发达国家和发展中国家的国家安全、主权以及经济因素等问题。这方面的主要问题与“遥感权”以及由遥感获得的数据的“传播权”有关。这些问题之所以如此突出,其潜在原因(虽然从来没有公开表明)是遥感的敏感方面。八十年代,这个复杂的问题由于遥感的更高分辨率、商业化以及发射遥感卫星国家的增多而进一步深化。对现有国际法的严格分析似乎表明存在有两种遥感——主动遥感和被动遥感。在严格的法律意义上,被动遥感可认为是合法的,而主动遥感的规约却不是那么明确。如果能够确定一个或一分辨率区间来区分“敏感的”和“非敏感”的数据,那么就能在遥感问题上达成一致协议。国际间唯一的遥感协议是在苏联和九个社会主义国家集团之间达成的。法国建议通过建立国际卫星监测机构(ISMA)利用卫星来监测武器控制及危机管理。
For years, people have been actively considering the issue of the international legal framework for the coordination of remote sensing activities. It appears that the main obstacle to achieving a unanimous United Nations agreement is the issues of national security, sovereignty and economic factors in developed and developing countries. The main issues in this regard relate to the “right to remote sensing” and the “right to spread” of the data obtained from remote sensing. These issues are so prominent that their underlying causes, though never publicly stated, are sensitive aspects of remote sensing. In the 1980s, this complex issue was further deepened by the higher resolution of remote sensing, commercialization and the increase in countries launching remote sensing satellites. A rigorous analysis of existing international law seems to indicate that there are two types of remote sensing - active sensing and passive sensing. In the strict legal sense, passive remote sensing can be considered as legal, but the protocol of active remote sensing is not so clear. If one or one resolution interval can be identified to distinguish between “sensitive” and “non-sensitive” data, an agreement on remote sensing can be reached. The only international agreement on remote sensing was reached between the Soviet Union and nine groups of socialist countries. France proposes the use of satellites to monitor weapons control and crisis management through the establishment of the International Satellite Monitoring Service (ISMA).