论文部分内容阅读
我国上市公司与其控股股东等关联方之间存在着千丝万缕的联系,他们之间形成的利益集团普遍利用关联交易实现控制权收益。本文通过构建企业与监管部门间的完全信息博弈模型,对企业产生非公允关联交易的部分条件进行了分析,发现在博弈中处于相对弱势地位的监管部门在均衡时往往会产生新规出台滞后和监督不严的现象,这些都为在博弈中占据优势地位的控股股东能比较自由地安排非公允关联交易提供了条件。
There are numerous connections between the listed companies in our country and the related parties such as their controlling shareholders, and the interest groups formed among them generally make use of related party transactions to realize the benefits of control. By building a complete information game model between enterprises and regulatory agencies, this paper analyzes some conditions of non-fair related party transactions in enterprises, and finds that regulators in a relatively weak position in the game tend to introduce lags The lack of supervision and oversight provide the conditions for controlling shareholders who play a dominant role in the game to arrange non-fair related party transactions more freely.