针对隐性知识外包中知识转移的激励问题,提出一个四阶段动态博弈模型:第一阶段客户设计激励合约;第二阶段服务商决定是否接受合约;第三阶段服务商决定转移的知识量;第四阶段客户决定产品产量。通过对模型的求解和分析,得出激励合约的特征,客户激励的有效性以及影响服务商知识转移的因素,为客户隐性知识外包的有效激励提供决策依据。 Aiming at the incentive problem of knowledge transfer in tacit knowledge outsourcing, a four-stage dynamic game model is proposed: the first stage customer design incentive contract; the second stage service provider decides whether to accept the contract; the third stage service provider decides the transfer knowledge volume; Four-stage customer determines product yield. Through the solution and analysis of the model, the characteristics of the incentive contract, the effectiveness of customer incentive and the factors that affect the knowledge transfer of service providers are obtained, which can provide decision-making basis for the effective incentive of customer’s tacit knowledge outsourcing.