基于“两权分离”的公司治理着力于解决公司所有者与经营者之间的利益目标不一致,而我国上市公司高度集中的股权结构却容易引发新的代理问题——控制性股东对中小股东利益的侵害。因此,本文从理论上构建基于股权结构相对/高度集中的公司治理分析框架,并建立基于中小投资者保护的公司治理评价指标体系,不但对公司治理理论进行有益的补充,而且为投资者提供了一种制度的评判依据。 The corporate governance based on “separation of two rights ” focuses on resolving the inconsistent interests between the owners and managers of the company, and the highly concentrated ownership structure of listed companies in China can easily lead to new agency problems - the controlling shareholders’ The interests of shareholders infringement. Therefore, this paper theoretically builds a relatively / highly concentrated corporate governance analysis framework based on ownership structure and establishes a corporate governance evaluation index system based on the protection of small and medium-sized investors. This not only provides a useful supplement to corporate governance theory, but also provides investors with A system of judging basis.