论文部分内容阅读
作为具有特殊功能的金融中介,商业银行的行业特征(资本结构的特殊性、合约的不透明性和监管的严格性)引起了银行治理中代理问题的复杂性(股东与经营者、股东与债权人、股东与监管者的代理问题),从而使银行治理目标呈现出多元化的价值取向(安全性、流动性、营利性)。在构造1999-2012年我国上市银行投资者立法保护水平指数的基础上,该文运用定性比较分析(QCA)对126个上市银行案例进行研究,重点考察了投资者立法保护及传统内部治理机制对银行治理绩效三个维度的影响。研究发现,投资者立法保护在达成三维银行治理目标的作用上比起内部治理机制更重要:在正面效应上,提高投资者立法保护水平是能够达成银行治理目标的关键;在负面效应上,较低的投资者立法保护水平会严重影响银行安全性、营利性绩效。从机制选择上来说,银行应当倾向于较小的董事会规模和较高的高管薪酬,尽量避免独立董事比例过低的情况。
As a financial intermediary with special functions, the commercial characteristics of commercial banks (the particularity of capital structure, the opacity of contracts and the strictness of supervision) have caused the complexity of agency problems in bank governance (shareholders and managers, shareholders and creditors, Shareholders and regulators of the agency issues), so that the goal of bank governance presents a diversified value orientation (security, liquidity, for-profit). On the basis of constructing the index of protection level of listed banks in our country from 1999 to 2012, this paper uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to study 126 listed bank cases, and focuses on the protection of investors’ legislation and the traditional internal governance mechanism The Impact of Three Dimensions of Bank Governance Performance. The study found that the protection of investors ’legislation is more important than the internal governance mechanism in achieving the goal of three-dimensional bank governance: on the positive side, raising the level of investors’ legislative protection is the key to achieving the goal of bank governance. On the negative side, Low level of investor protection legislation will seriously affect the safety of banks, for-profit performance. In terms of mechanism choice, banks should be inclined to smaller board size and higher executive compensation, try to avoid the situation of low proportion of independent directors.