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横向并购可能给参与并购的企业带来成本节约而产生效率效应,同时也可能产生反竞争效应。在横向并购反垄断审查的效率抗辩中,并购企业只要能够证实成本节约的效率效应能够抵消反竞争效应进而增进社会总福利水平,就可以获得反垄断当局的批准。然而,成本节约及其实现程度具有不确定性,成本节约的不确定性不仅会影响消费者剩余和社会总福利水平,而且将对效率抗辩和反垄断当局并购审查的判定规则产生影响。本文以Cournot模型为基础,系统分析了成本节约的不确定性对于横向并购反垄断评估审查中效率抗辩、判定规则和预期消费者福利的影响,为反垄断当局在并购评估审查中如何考虑效率因素提供决策参考。
Horizontal mergers and acquisitions may bring cost savings to the participating companies to produce efficiency effects, but also may have anti-competitive effects. In the efficiency defense of horizontal merger and acquisition antitrust review, M & A firms can obtain the approval of antitrust authorities as long as they can demonstrate that the efficiency effect of cost saving can offset the anti-competitive effect and thus increase the total social welfare level. However, the cost savings and the degree of their realization are uncertain. The uncertainty of cost savings will not only affect the level of consumer surplus and social welfare, but also will affect the efficiency defense and the rule of determination of antitrust mergers and acquisitions review. Based on the Cournot model, this paper systematically analyzes the impact of cost-saving uncertainty on the efficiency defense, judgment rules and expected consumer welfare in the cross-border M & A antitrust assessment, and how to consider the efficiency factor for antitrust authorities in M & A review Provide decision-making reference.