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本文通过区分企业绩效的正与负、上升与下降,分析了我国高管薪酬一绩效敏感度的不对称性和粘性特征。实证结果显示,企业获得正绩效时,高管薪酬与企业绩效关联紧密,企业获得负绩效时,高管薪酬与企业绩效挂钩程度减弱;绩效提升时,薪酬—绩效灵敏度增强,绩效下降时,薪酬绩效灵敏度下降。进一步的分析表明,国有控股企业、保护性行业高管薪酬的不对称性和粘性显著高于民营企业和竞争性行业。其内在的逻辑是,企业的市场地位(如控股类型和垄断程度)决定了其治理结构,并通过管理层权力影响薪酬绩效敏感度,从而导致了粘性和不对称性。本文的分析为市场化改革提供了参考,国有企业改制、打破行政垄断仍应作为改革的重点有序推进。
This paper analyzes the asymmetry and sticky characteristics of the performance-based sensitivity of the executive pay in our country by distinguishing the positive, negative, positive and negative effects of the enterprise performance. The empirical results show that the executive compensation is closely related to firm performance when the firm obtains positive performance, and the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance weakens when the firm gains negative performance. When the performance is improved, the salary-performance sensitivity increases, and when the performance declines, Performance sensitivity decreased. Further analysis shows that the asymmetry and stickiness of executive pay in state-controlled enterprises and protective industries are significantly higher than those in private enterprises and competitive industries. The inherent logic is that the firm’s market position (such as the type of holding and monopoly) determines its governance structure and affects the pay performance sensitivity through management power, leading to stickiness and asymmetry. The analysis of this article provides a reference for the market-oriented reform. The restructuring of state-owned enterprises and the breaking of administrative monopoly should be promoted in an orderly manner as the focus of the reform.