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资本市场的迅猛发展使公司治理的重心由股东与经理的委托代理问题转向控股股东与中小股东的委托代理问题。基于股东同质化假定建立的股权平等原则形成的资本多数决因人的逐利本性产生异化,成为控股股东滥用权力侵害小股东的武器。累积投票制的建立未能有效解决问题,小股东的投资信心被挫败不利于证券资本市场发展。股东异质化合理存在的现实环境下,由股权配置的一元化转向多元化,引入类别股份制度能完善小股东事前保护机制。类别股份下的多重投票权股有利于公司控制权的有效锁定,从而间接保护小股东利益。
The rapid development of capital market makes the focus of corporate governance shift from the principal-agent problem of shareholders and managers to the principal-agent problem of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The majority of the capital formed based on the principle of equal equity established based on the assumption of shareholder’s homogeneity becomes alienated due to the pursuit of profit-seeking nature and becomes the weapon of the controlling shareholders to abuse their power against the minority shareholders. The establishment of cumulative voting system failed to effectively solve the problem, and the frustration of the investment confidence of minority shareholders is not conducive to the development of securities capital market. Under the realistic circumstance of shareholder heterogeneity, the unification of equity allocation turns diversified. The introduction of a class share system can improve the pre-protection mechanism for minority shareholders. The multiple voting shares under the class shares help to effectively lock the control of the company, so as to indirectly protect the interests of minority shareholders.