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在原始社会末期,部落集团间的政治冲突取向与囚徒困境很相似。在这种境况下,人类开始寻求解决囚徒困境的方式以促成合作,但这种合作因缺乏强有力的惩罚机制显得相当脆弱。在此种社会语境下,人类解决囚徒困境要求有一种强有力的机制保证合作持续进行。法因有着国家暴力作为后盾,能及时规范博弈规则且不再产生任何社会成本,成为人类走出囚徒困境的必然选择。
At the end of Primitive Society, the orientation of political conflicts among tribal groups is very similar to that of prisoners. Under such circumstances, mankind has begun to seek ways to solve the prisoner’s dilemma in order to promote cooperation, but such cooperation appears to be rather weak due to the lack of a strong punishment mechanism. In such a social context, mankind’s resolution of the prisoner’s dilemma requires a strong mechanism to ensure the continuation of cooperation. With the national violence as the backup, the law can timely regulate the rules of the game and no longer generate any social costs, becoming the inevitable choice for the human being to get out of the prisoner’s dilemma.