论文部分内容阅读
我国企业会计制度选择空间的存在、公司治理及法制惩罚的薄弱使得盈余管理寻租行为难以避免。为有效治理盈余管理寻租,本文基于声誉视角,利用声誉动态博弈模型,分析外部投资者和政府监管者对盈余管理参与主体的多重声誉制约,最后提出声誉机制治理盈余管理寻租的相关措施。
The existence of the choice of corporate accounting system in our country and the weakness of corporate governance and legal punishment make it hard to avoid earnings management rent-seeking. In order to effectively manage the rent-seeking of earnings management, the paper uses the dynamic game theory of reputation to analyze the multiple reputation constraints of external investors and government regulators on the participants of earnings management. Finally, the paper puts forward the measures of reputational mechanism to manage the rent-seeking of earnings management.