论文部分内容阅读
选择两阶段资金约束型供应链为研究对象,以零售商运营资金不足作为前提条件,分别构建了银行直接贷款时供应链合作双方的收益共享契约模型,和保兑仓模式下收益共享契约模型,应用Stackelberg博弈模型分别求解出分散决策下制造商的最优批发价格、收入分享比例,和零售商的最优订货量.对比两种融资模式发现,保兑仓模式下的最优订货量及供应链总利润均大于银行直接贷款模式.且保兑仓模式下的最大受益者仍是制造商,零售商并未获得更多利益.制造商的利润对收入共享系数具有单调递减的趋势,批发价格随收益共享系数的增大而增大.而零售商的利润并非单调增加,只有当共享系数超过某一数值后,零售商利润才会比银行直接贷款时大,双方才能实现利润提高,即实现改进供应链整体运作绩效的同时达到互惠双赢的目标.
Choose the two-stage fund-constrained supply chain as the research object, take retailer’s operating fund as the prerequisite, construct the revenue-sharing contract model of both supply chain partners and the revenue-sharing contract model of the reserve bank model respectively when the bank direct loans, The Stackelberg game model is used to solve the optimal wholesale price, revenue sharing ratio and retailer’s optimal order quantity respectively under the decentralized decision-making.Comparing the two financing modes, we find that the optimal order quantity and supply Chain total profit is greater than the bank direct loan mode and the largest beneficiary of the confirmatory position mode is still the manufacturer, retailers did not get more benefits.Manufacturer’s profit on the income sharing coefficient monotonically decreasing trend, the wholesale price With the revenue sharing factor increases, while the retailer’s profit does not increase monotonically, only when the sharing coefficient exceeds a certain value, the retailer’s profit will be larger than the direct bank loans, both parties can achieve profits, that is to achieve Improve the overall performance of the supply chain while achieving the goal of mutual benefit and win-win.