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本文从公司内部治理角度对我国上市公司关联交易进行研究后发现,股权结构对关联交易行为有很大影响;我国独立董事制度的建立,在一定程度上有效约束和减少了关联交易;董事长与总经理两职合一更促进了关联交易行为的发生;监事对关联交易行为的监督机制还没有充分发挥;管理层没有通过频繁的关联交易来提升公司业绩,债权人还未能积极参与到公司治理中,也就不可能有效抑制非公允关联交易行为的发生。
This paper studies the related party transactions of Chinese listed companies from the perspective of internal governance and finds that ownership structure has a great influence on related party transactions. The establishment of independent director system in our country effectively restrains and reduces related party transactions to a certain degree. The combination of the two positions of the general manager promoted the occurrence of related party transactions; supervisors did not give full play to the supervisory mechanism of related party transactions; management did not improve corporate performance through frequent related party transactions; and creditors have not actively participated in corporate governance It is impossible to effectively suppress the occurrence of non-fair related party transactions.