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本文以“逆向软预算约束”概念概括基层政府自上而下向所管辖区域中的下属组织和个人索取资源的行为,并从组织分析角度探讨这类现象产生的渊源:在微观层次上,干部晋升制度的机制和信息不对称导致了基层政府官员追求资源密集型政绩工程的短期利益,为不断突破已有预算约束、追求预算外资源的政府行为提供了激励;在宏观层次上,组织制度自上而下的约束机制由于上下级政府官员的共同利益联合而难以有效运行,自下而上的企业或个人的抵制活动因组织程度的不对称而无法奏效,而权、责、利三位一体在实际运行中的分离导致责任目标制度的失败。因此,宏观组织制度难以对政府官员的行为实行有效约束。
In this paper, the concept of “reverse soft budget constraint” is used to summarize the behavior of grass-roots government from top to bottom to obtain resources from subordinate organizations and individuals in the jurisdiction and explore the origins of such phenomena from an organizational perspective: at the micro level, The mechanism and information asymmetry of the promotion system led to the short-term interests of grassroots government officials in pursuing resource-intensive performance projects and provided incentives for continuously breaking the existing budgetary constraints and pursuing extra-budgetary government actions. At the macro level, The top-down restraint mechanism is difficult to operate effectively due to the joint common interests of government officials at the lower and lower levels. The bottom-up business or individual boycotts can not work because of the degree of organization asymmetry. However, The separation in operation leads to the failure of the responsibility target system. Therefore, it is difficult for the macro organization system to effectively control the behavior of government officials.