在信息不对称情况下,政府无法观测到回收企业的真实努力程度。运用激励理论,研究在回收商竞争的情况下,政府通过激励契约设计,可激励回收商提高回收努力程度。研究结果表明:政府补贴越多时,回收商倾向于提高努力程度以获取更多的收益;竞争越激烈时,回收商出于保护已有市场份额的考虑,也会提高自身努力程度。 In the case of asymmetric information, the government can not observe the real effort to recycle business. Using incentive theory to study the competition of recyclers, the government through incentive contract design, can encourage recyclers to improve recycling efforts. The results show that when the government subsidies are more, the recyclers tend to increase their efforts to obtain more benefits. When the competition is fiercer, the recyclers will also increase their efforts to protect the existing market share.