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本文使用2003～2010年51家商业银行的数据检验了银行董事会结构的内生决定因素及其对银行收益与风险的影响。研究表明:董事会规模与银行规模正相关,与其贷款领域负相关,与以资产收益率衡量的CEO谈判力量显著负相关。在董事会独立性方面,董事会独立性与银行多样化经营程度显著正相关,与以资产收益率和行长年龄衡量的CEO谈判力量负相关。在董事会结构对银行收益和风险的影响方面,董事会规模与银行资产收益率负相关,董事会独立性与银行资产收益率正相关,但均不显著;董事会规模和独立性均与银行不良贷款率正相关。
This paper uses the data of 51 commercial banks from 2003 to 2010 to test the endogenous determinants of the bank’s board structure and its impact on the bank’s earnings and risks. Research shows that the size of the board of directors is positively correlated with the size of the bank, negatively correlated with its loan area, and significantly negatively correlated with the strength of the CEO negotiation measured by return on assets. In the aspect of board independence, the independence of the board of directors is significantly and positively related to the diversification degree of the bank, and negatively correlated with the strength of CEO negotiation measured by the return on assets and the age of the president. In terms of the influence of the board structure on bank returns and risks, the size of the board of directors is negatively correlated with the rate of return on bank assets. The independence of the board of directors is positively related to the rate of return on bank assets, but both are insignificant. The size and independence of the board of directors are both positively correlated with the bank’s non-performing loan rate Related.