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本文认为，作为公有产权安排的全民所有制企业，其实际运行是通过多层次的委托代理关系来进行的，因此，公有制企业产权实现的难点就归结到了代理成本问题。文章在理解代理成本的构成及其性质的基础上，进一步就委托代理关系中的剩余索取权问题进行了剖解，从而阐述了公有产权的实现必须具备５个条件：一是委托人追求最优资源配置的目标；二是缩减代理层次，使代理费用最小化；三是委托人对代理人的“用手投票”，代理人亦可以“用脚投票”；四是存在充分竞争的委托人和代理人市场；五是存在充分竞争的一般产品市场和要素市场。
This paper holds that the actual operation of state-owned enterprises as publicly owned property rights is carried out through multi-level principal-agent relations. Therefore, the difficulty in realizing the ownership of publicly owned enterprises is attributed to the issue of agency costs. On the basis of understanding the composition and nature of agency costs, the article further analyzes the issue of residual claim rights in the entrusted agency relationship, thus expounding that the realization of public property rights must have five conditions: First, the client seeks the best resources. The second goal is to reduce the level of agency and minimize agency costs; third, the principal’s “voting by hand” to the agent, and the agent can “vote with his feet”; fourth is the existence of a fully competitive client and agent. The people market; Fifth, there is a general competition in the general product market and factor markets.