本文从公司股价崩盘风险这一视角来探讨退市监管的治理作用,以2012年深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所推出的较之前更为严格的“退市新规”作为准自然实验,选取2010—2013年A股上市公司为样本,采用双重差分方法控制内生性问题,研究发现:与退市新规实施之前相比,受退市新规影响的上市公司在退市新规之后其股价崩盘风险更低,表明退市监管能够降低股价崩盘风险。本文还发现,退市监管降低上市公司股价崩盘风险,主要是通过业绩提升而非信息披露操纵和盈余管理发挥作用。进一步研究发现,更低的企业代理成本、更好的信息透明度,以及更好的外部治理监督有助于更好地发挥退市监管降低股价崩盘风险的作用,最终有利于提高市场定价效率和企业价值。以上研究结果表明,更加严格的退市监管对提高上市公司的信息透明度、维持资本市场的良好运作有着重要的积极作用。 This paper explores the governance role of delisting supervision from the perspective of the crash of share price of the company. Taking the more stringent “delisting rules” introduced by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2012 as a quasi-natural experiment , Choose 2010-2013 A-share listed companies as a sample, the use of double difference method to control endogeneity problems, the study found that: compared with before the new delisting regulations, the new regulations affected by the delisting of the new rules after the delisting Its share price crash risk is lower, indicating that delisting regulation can reduce the risk of a share price crash. The article also finds that delisting supervision reduces the risk of the stock price collapse of listed companies mainly through the performance improvement rather than the information disclosure control and the earnings management. Further research has found that lower agency costs, better information transparency, and better external governance oversight can help better exert delisting regulation to reduce the risk of stock price collapse and ultimately help improve market pricing efficiency and business value. The above findings show that more stringent delisting supervision plays an important and positive role in improving the transparency of listed companies and maintaining the sound operation of capital markets.