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由产权、信息等原因带来的代理问题是现代股份公司中急需解决的问题之一。其次优解之一便是荻取信息。在从内部获取信息失败后,兼并便成为了从外部获取信息以解决代理问题的一种机制,其作用在于事后对偷懒经理惩罚。与美国的这种状况相比,日本企业结构的特殊性造成的其代理问题的特殊性导致兼并在日本表现出特殊形式。因此,中国应根据自身企业代理问题的状况对兼并模式作出慎重选择。
The agency problem caused by property rights and information is one of the most urgent problems to be solved in modern joint-stock companies. Second, one of the best solution is Di take information. After failing to access information internally, the merger becomes a mechanism for obtaining information from the outside in order to solve the agency problem, the effect of which is to punish the lazy manager afterwards. Compared with the situation in the United States, the particularity of the agency problem caused by the particularity of the structure of Japanese enterprises has led to the special form of mergers in Japan. Therefore, China should make a prudent choice on the mode of merger according to the status of its own agency problem.