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本文拟采用告研究法和事件研究法,探讨从投资者保护的角度考察是否应强制上市公司现金分红,从而比较股利信号理论与股利代理成本理论对中国资本市场上股利作用的解释力度。公告研究发现:没有明显证据表明对于未预期的股利,市场会给予显著反应。事件研究发现:在事件窗口期,市场会有明显的正向反应;而对于现金流问题严重成长性差的企业,市场也会给予明显的正向反应。可见股利代理成本理论更能解释股利作用,而强制上市公司现金分红能增强这一作用。所以从保护投资者的角度,目前证据支持强制现金分红政策。
This article intends to use the law of law and incident research to explore whether investors should pay attention to the cash dividends of listed companies from the perspective of investor protection so as to compare the dividend signal theory and dividend agency cost theory to explain the role of dividend in China’s capital market. Announcement The study found that: There is no clear evidence that the market will give a significant response to unexpected dividends. The incident study found that: in the event window period, the market will have a clear positive response; and for serious cash flow problems of poor growth companies, the market will give a clear positive response. It can be seen that the theory of dividend agency costs can better explain the role of dividends, while the mandatory cash dividend of listed companies can enhance this role. So from the perspective of investor protection, the evidence supports the mandatory cash dividend policy.