论文部分内容阅读
长期以来,在一个税权高度集中、融资权高度统一的多级政府体制下,地方政府支出内生性和政府间支出目标非一致性对中央财政支出政策调控效果的影响一直被忽视。本文通过简单的乘数模型对此进行了分析和数值模拟,结果表明,支出内生性和目标非一致性对中央财政支出政策的调控效果具有显著和非对称性影响。在此基础上,利用我国经验数据对支出内生性和目标非一致性的存在性进行了实证检验,结果表明,我国地方政府的财政支出并不具有显著的内生性,同时也没有证据表明我国中央地方财政调控目标存在差异,以及地方政府扩张冲动对中央财政支出政策的调控效果产生显著和非对称性影响。
For a long time, under the multi-level government system with a highly centralized tax right and a high degree of financing power, the impact of the inconsistency between local endowment expenditure and intergovernmental expenditure target on the regulation and control of central government spending has been neglected. This paper analyzes and simulates this through a simple multiplier model. The results show that expenditure endogenous and target non-uniformity have a significant and asymmetric effect on the control effect of the central government’s expenditure policy. On this basis, we use the empirical data of our country to test the externality of expenditure and the existence of target non-consistency. The result shows that the fiscal expenditure of local government in our country does not have obvious endogeneity, and there is no evidence to prove that central government of our country The differences in the goals of local fiscal control and the impulse of expansion of local governments have a significant and asymmetrical effect on the control effect of the central government’s expenditure policy.