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赊销交易中,若零售商的销售能力是私人信息,则供应商的赊销风险将增加.为给供应商提供甄别零售商销售能力的方法和依据以控制赊销风险,运用激励理论构建激励模型并求解得到激励契约,将其与对称信息下赊销交易和不对称信息下现金交易中的激励契约进行比较.结果表明,该激励契约能够甄别零售商的能力,不对称信息下的产品交易量均向下扭曲,赊销交易能够减轻产品交易量的扭曲程度和降低甄别成本.最后通过算例分析验证了主要结论.
In the credit transaction, if the retailer’s sales ability is private information, the supplier’s credit risk will increase.In order to provide the supplier with the method and basis to discriminate retailer’s sales ability to control the credit risk, the incentive model is constructed and solved The incentive contract is obtained, which is compared with the incentive contract in the cash transaction under the symmetrical information and the asymmetric information.The results show that the incentive contract can identify the retailer’s ability, the transaction volume under the asymmetric information is downward Distortion and credit transaction can reduce the degree of distortions and reduce the screening cost of the product transaction.Finally, the main conclusions are verified by an example analysis.