公共品的自愿提供既是一个经济问题,也是一个政治问题。在政治领域,投票是个体表达对于公共品和公共服务偏好的重要机制。我们设计了一个实验室实验,试图去探究投票规则的变化对公共品自愿提供是否会产生影响,以及会有何种影响。我们发现:各种投票机制都无法在总量上显著提高公共品自愿提供水平,但是投票在边际上存在积极的承诺效应和信号效应。我们还发现,投出赞成票后的违约行为是导致投票机制在总体上无效的关键因素。此外,社会偏好和异质禀赋也对附设了投票机制的公共品自愿提供有显著的影响。 Voluntary provision of public goods is both an economic issue and a political one. In the political arena, voting is an important mechanism for individuals to express their preference for public goods and public services. We designed a lab experiment that sought to explore whether and to what extent changes in voting rules would have an impact on the voluntary provision of public goods. We find that all kinds of voting mechanisms can not significantly improve the voluntary provision of public goods in the aggregate, but voting has a positive promise effect and signal effect on the margin. We also found that the default after the vote was a key factor in the overall invalidation of the voting mechanism. In addition, social preferences and heterogeneous endowments also have a significant impact on the voluntary provision of public goods that have a voting mechanism attached.