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本文选取2012-2014年所有上市公司数据为样本,以高管变更这一公司治理最为显性和直接的表现出发,分析了高管权力与预算松弛之间可能潜在的替代关系。研究发现:在高管变更这一重大治理事件中,预算松弛能降低高管变更概率与高管权力之间的敏感性,且预算松弛与高管权力之间存在替代效应,在高管权力不足以抵抗变更风险时,可通过预算松弛降低变更风险。
Based on the data of all the listed companies from 2012 to 2014, this dissertation takes the change of executives as the most obvious and direct manifestation of corporate governance, and analyzes the possible potential substitution between executive power and budgetary slack. The study found that in the event of a major change of management, budgetary slackening can reduce the sensitivity between the probability of executive change and executive power, and there is a substitution effect between budget slack and executive power. When executive power is insufficient To resist the risk of change, the risk of change can be reduced through budget slack.