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国际经济法的经济分析是建立在国家是理性的自我利益最大化的个体行为者的假设之上的。在国家间经济关系中,各国为了减少交易成本,克服合作困境,追求更大收益,产生了国际经济法。因其欲解决问题的属性差异和变量不同,国际经济法表现出丰富多样的具体内容和制度形态。各国基于互惠、报复和声誉等理性的自利考虑,经常选择遵从国际经济法。在一定条件下,国际经济法确实促进了国家之间的要素流动、经济增长乃至国民福利和全球福利。对贸易协定和投资条约以及经济领域的其他国际公法制度的实证研究表明,法经济学对于国际经济法律制度的生成、形态、内容、遵从乃至绩效具有很强的解释力。但是,法经济学的分析进路也有其自身的局限性。
The economic analysis of international economic law is based on the assumption that the state is a rational individual with the maximized self-interest. In the economic relations between countries, all countries have created international economic law in order to reduce transaction costs, overcome cooperation difficulties and pursue greater benefits. Due to the differences in attributes and variables in their desire to solve the problem, international economic law has shown a rich variety of specific contents and institutional forms. Based on the rational self-interest such as reciprocity, revenge and reputation, all countries often choose to comply with international economic law. Under certain conditions, international economic law has indeed promoted the flow of elements among nations, economic growth and even national welfare and global welfare. Empirical studies on trade agreements and investment treaties and other international public law systems in the economic field show that law and economics have strong explanatory power for the formation, form, content, compliance and performance of the international economic law system. However, the analysis of law and economics also has its own limitations.