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心理学的相关研究表明,过度自信是一种“优于平均”的效应。基于行为金融研究,以董事会业绩预告偏差作为衡量董事会过度自信的替代变量,采用2008-2013年A股制造业上市公司平衡面板数据,通过系统GMM及OLS最小二乘回归方法,从静态和动态两个层面,实证检验了董事会过度自信对公司负债决策的影响,以及控股股东性质对两者之间关系的调节作用。研究发现,董事会过度自信不仅会带来上市公司激进负债行为,而且容易导致资本结构反向调整,降低资本结构调整效果;而控股股东性质为国有性质时,董事会过度自信对资本结构决策的负面影响不再显著。这说明,董事会过度自信不利于上市公司资本结构决策,而控股股东的国有性质能有效纠正董事会过度自信导致的非理性行为。
Psychological research shows that overconfidence is a “better than average” effect. Based on the behavioral finance research, taking the deviation of the performance prediction of the board of directors as the alternative variable to measure the overconfidence of the board of directors, the panel data of the A-share manufacturing listed companies in 2008-2013 is used. By using GMM and OLS least squares regression methods, At the same time, this paper empirically tests the influence of excessive self-confidence of the board of directors on the company’s debt decision-making and the regulatory role of the nature of the controlling shareholder in the relationship between the two. The study found that the overconfidence of the board of directors not only brings about radical debt behavior of listed companies, but also leads to the reverse adjustment of capital structure and the effect of capital structure adjustment. When the nature of controlling shareholder is state-owned, the negative influence of board overconfidence on capital structure decision-making No longer significant. This shows that overconfidence in the board of directors is not conducive to the capital structure decision-making of listed companies, and the state-owned nature of controlling shareholders can effectively correct the irrational behavior caused by overconfidence in the board of directors.