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Based on the actual experience of cooperation in the supply chain, the Nash solution of two enterprises cooperative games is given. Not only is the solution unique, but it is also stable, and neither side has the capability to deviate the allocation of interests from the equilibrium point. If some firm tries to withdraw from cooperation or threaten to use other particular strategy, the negotiations are likely to achieve the distribution by the threat game; The calculating method of the choice of the optimal bargaining base point and the corresponding optimal pay-off vector are given.
Based on the actual experience of cooperation in the supply chain, the Nash solution of two enterprises cooperative games is given. Not only is the solution unique, but it is also stable, and neither side has the ability to deviate the allocation of interests from the the equilibrium point. If some firm tries to withdraw from cooperation or threaten to use other particular strategy, the negotiation is likely to achieve the distribution by the threat game; The calculating method of the choice of the optimal bargaining base point and the corresponding optimal pay- off vector are given.