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在上市公司中， 有效实施内部控制能够在一定程度上约束经理人的自利行为， 降低经理人代理成本，有效提高公司业绩。 而一些理性的经理人必然会根据公司业绩提出相应的薪酬以实现对自身报酬的弥补。 本文以 《企业内部控制配套指引》 在沪深主板上市公司为实施背景， 以２０１４ 年内部控制信息为样本信息， 在薪酬契约的理论上， 描述当前我国上市公司内部控制缺陷纰漏行业特征， 探究上市公司内部控制缺陷披露与高管薪酬关系。 研究发现， 我国上市公司内部控制缺陷披露与其高管水平存在一种倒置现象。
In the listed company, the effective implementation of internal control can restrain the manager's self-interest to a certain extent, reduce the manager's agency cost, and effectively improve the company's performance. However, some rational managers will inevitably put forward corresponding remuneration according to the performance of the company in order to make up for their remuneration. Based on the supporting information of internal control of enterprises in the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, taking the internal control information of 2014 as the sample information, this paper describes the characteristics of the industry flaws in the internal control defects of listed companies in China in the theory of salary contract, Disclosure of Internal Control Defects and Top Management Compensation. The study found that there is an inversion in the disclosure of internal control defects in Chinese listed companies and their executives.