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在服务外包合作关系中,项目执行的结果与客户企业参与程度、服务商的努力水平以及专用性资产投入有关。由于机会主义行为的存在,增加了专用性资产投资的套牢风险问题,同时会引发双边道德风险问题,基于此设计了专用性资产投资的收益共享激励机制的关系契约。通过对关系契约中自我实施性的影响因素的分析与计算,得到了信息不对称条件下服务外包的最优激励合同模型。研究表明:资产的专用度越高,越不利于关系契约的自我实施;当专用性资产内部成本节约率越大,越有利于关系契约的自我实施;而专用性资产外部成本率以及专用性资产外部价值率对关系契约的影响受多个因素共同影响。
In the service outsourcing cooperation relationship, the result of the project implementation is related to the degree of customer’s business participation, service level of the service provider and the dedicated asset investment. Due to the existence of opportunistic behavior, the problem of jailing the risk of special assets investment is increased, at the same time, the problem of bilateral moral hazard will be triggered. Based on this, the contract of contract of revenue sharing incentive mechanism for the special assets investment is designed. Through the analysis and calculation of the influencing factors of self-implementation in the relationship contract, the optimal incentive contract model of service outsourcing under the condition of information asymmetry is obtained. The research shows that the higher the specialization of assets is, the more it is not conducive to the self-implementation of the contract. When the internal cost-saving ratio of the special-purpose assets is higher, the more conducive to self-actualization of the contract of contract. And the external cost ratio of special assets and the special assets The impact of the external value rate on the contractual relationship is influenced by several factors.