以公司负责人和财务总监的同期离任为观测对象,并以真实盈余管理为例,实证检验传统的“视界问题”。研究发现:公司负责人在离任前一年存在通过真实盈余管理操控业绩的行为;财务总监的同期离任加剧了公司负责人离任前的真实盈余管理;高管持股和高质量审计能够在一定程度上抑制公司负责人离任前的真实盈余管理,以及公司负责人和财务总监同期离任前的真实盈余管理合谋;高管离任前在不同真实盈余管理方式上存在偏好。 Taking the resignation of the head and chief financial officer of the Company as the observation object in the same period, and taking the real earnings management as an example, the paper tests the traditional “horizon problem” empirically. The study found that: the head of the company existed in the performance control of real earnings management in the year prior to leaving the company; the departure of chief financial officer in the same period exacerbated the real earnings management before the head of the company left; the senior executives holding shares and high-quality auditing To some extent, it restrains the real earnings management before the head of the company leaves office and the real earnings management collusion before the departure of the head and chief financial officer of the company. The executives have different preferences in the management of different real earnings before leaving office.