道德判断的非认知化是20世纪伦理学非形而上学化的体现。传统认知主义道德判断以自然主义即主观主义和客观主义的划分特征,现代非认知主义道德判断则以直觉主义对自然主义的否定,以及情感主义对直觉主义的改进为标志。从价值的方面而不是从事实的方面来看待道德判断的性质,是现代伦理学区别于传统伦理学的主要特点。传统自然主义由于摩尔直觉主义的批判而走向衰落,情感主义借助哲学中语言学的转向实现了伦理学由传统向现代的转型。但另一方面,伦理判断是否一定表现为情感判断,由此而引起的分歧,又从更深的层次上反映出情感价值主义判断取向的不完善性。 Non-cognition of moral judgment is the non-metaphysical embodiment of 20th century ethics. The traditional cognition moral judgments are divided by naturalism, subjectivism and objectivism. Modern non-cognitivist moral judgments are characterized by intuitionistic negation of naturalism and emotionalism’s improvement of intuitionism. Judging the nature of moral judgments from the aspect of value instead of from facts is the main characteristic of modern ethics different from traditional ethics. Traditional naturalism declined due to the criticism of Moore intuitionism. Emotionalism transformed the ethics from traditional to modern with the help of philosophical linguistics. However, on the other hand, whether ethical judgment must be expressed as emotional judgment or not, the disagreements caused by it also reflect the imperfection of judgment of emotional valueism from a deeper level.