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高度制度化的《稳定与增长公约》赋予了欧盟经济财政理事会制裁违背其预算目标的成员国的权力。从2003年11月的欧盟经济财政理事会会议可以看出,它的自由裁量权是相当大的,但不是无限的。欧盟委员会已经为公约做出了更有弹性的解释,以及针对违反公约的成员国的更严厉的制裁,并成功地为欧盟经济财政理事会决议的合法性提起诉讼。我们认为软法在欧洲货币联盟的财政框架中所展现的优势是适合解决经济协调中的不确定性的。这表明了委员会建议书中的固有张力:尽管关于公约的更加灵活的解释为成员国从稳健的预算状况开始的财政策略预留了更多空间,但同时也为欧盟经济财政理事会衡量其是否合规加大了难度。这种不确定性再次强调了公约的软法性因素,而不是支持其制裁机制的效力。
The highly institutionalized Stability and Growth Pact gives the EU Economic and Financial Council the power to impose sanctions on member countries that run counter to its budgetary goals. As can be seen from the meeting of the EU Economic and Financial Council held in November 2003, its discretion is considerable but not limitless. The European Commission has already made a more flexible explanation of the convention and tougher sanctions against member states that violate the convention and has successfully prosecuted the legitimacy of EU Economic and Financial Council resolutions. We think the advantage that soft law shows in the fiscal framework of the European Monetary Union is that it is suitable for resolving the uncertainties in economic coordination. This shows the inherent tension in the Commission’s proposal: Although a more flexible interpretation of the convention leaves room for more fiscal policy in Member States starting with a robust budgetary situation, it also measures whether the EU Economic and Financial Council Compliance has increased the difficulty. This uncertainty re-emphasizes the soft-law elements of the Convention, rather than supporting the effectiveness of its sanctions regime.