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以2005至2012年间曾经被出示过非标意见的251家公司为样本,本文从不同的角度对审计意见的决策有用性进行了研究,实证检验了审计意见对经理薪酬契约的影响。我们发现,就整体来说,审计意见越好,经理的薪酬业绩敏感度越高,不过审计意见的这种影响作用仅在内部监督机制较弱同时具有较高审计需求的国有企业中存在,而在民营企业中则并不明显。进一步的研究还显示,在法制环境相对完善的地区,审计意见对经理薪酬业绩敏感度产生了显著影响,而在法制环境相对落后的地区则并不存在这种关系,究其原因,可能是良好的法制环境有利于保持审计服务的独立性,因此审计意见对薪酬契约的影响也更明显。
Taking the 251 companies that have been presented as non-standard opinions from 2005 to 2012 as samples, this paper studies the usefulness of the audit opinions from different perspectives and tests empirically the impact of audit opinion on manager’s salary contract. On the whole, we find that the better the audit opinion, the higher the manager’s salary performance sensitivity. However, the effect of the audit opinion only exists in state-owned enterprises that have weak internal supervision mechanism and high audit requirements. In private enterprises is not obvious. Further research also shows that audit opinions have a significant impact on managers’ remuneration performance sensitivity in areas where the legal environment is relatively sound, but not in jurisdictions with relatively backward legal systems. The reason may be good The legal environment is conducive to maintaining the independence of audit services, so the audit opinion on the pay contract is also more obvious.