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2013年公司资本制度改革之所以未出现许多学者担心的后果,是因为改革之前这些后果就已经出现。受阻于预算、编制和技术等多重约束,执法机关实际上不具备对中小微企业进行资本监管的能力,资本欺诈行为早已泛滥,监管流于形式。因而,2013年改革实际上是对监管失灵的常态应对,针对徒劳无益的资本监管,改革至少节省了监管的执法成本以及应对监管的企业成本,这是改革后中小微企业注册数量剧增的主因。
The reason why the reform of the company’s capital system did not appear to have worried many fellow scholars in 2013 was that the consequences of the reform were already on the horizon. Blocked by multiple constraints such as budget, establishment and technology, law enforcement agencies do not actually have the ability to supervise small and medium-sized micro-enterprises in capital. The phenomenon of capital fraud has long been flooding and regulation has become a mere formality. Therefore, the reform in 2013 was actually the normal response to the regulatory failure. In response to the futile capital supervision, the reform saved at least the regulatory costs of enforcement and the corporate costs of regulation. This was the main reason for the sharp increase in the number of registered SMEs in the reform .