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本文讨论了在中国经济转轨过程中保证非人格化交易的一种过渡性机制:地方官员代理人机制。在转轨过程中,当正式的司法制度在合同执行上的效力还不足时,处于特定的关系网络和权力位置的地方官员能够保证某些非人格化交易的合同得到履行。这一机制的两个政治经济学含义是:(1)中国市场化改革带来了众多交易机会,但不是所有的个人都拥有同样的利用这些机会的能力。(2)市场交易所带来的收益——经济租金的分配不但取决于生产要素的边际产品价值,而且,权力也参与到了分配过程中。文章通过一个完全信息的动态博弈模型对上述思想进行了更加严格的表述。从静态的角度看,该机制具有福利上的帕累托改进特征,尽管它同时也有对福利的重新分配效应;但是,从比较静态和动态的角度看,这一机制却会产生对市场深化的阻碍作用。而且,长期使用该机制将不利于向基于正式法庭制度的合同执行机制的过渡。
This article discusses a transitional mechanism that guarantees impersonal transactions in the process of China’s economic transition: the local official agent mechanism. In the process of transition, when official judicial system is not effective enough in contract enforcement, local officials in a particular network of relations and power can guarantee that certain contracts of impersonal transactions are fulfilled. The two political economic implications of this mechanism are: (1) China’s market-oriented reforms have brought many trading opportunities, but not all individuals have the same ability to exploit these opportunities. (2) Gains from Market Exchanges - The distribution of economic rent depends not only on the marginal product value of the factors of production but also on the distribution process. Through a complete information dynamic game model, the article makes a more strict statement of the above thought. From a static perspective, the mechanism has the Pareto-improving feature of welfare, although it also has the effect of redistribution of benefits; however, from a comparatively static and dynamic perspective, this mechanism has the effect of deepening the market Impeding effect. Moreover, long-term use of the mechanism would not be conducive to the transition to a contract enforcement mechanism based on a formal court system.