国有资产管理体制改革未能解决国有资产所有者缺位问题,股改后国有控股公司中的经营者的“提拔制”使其仍未摆脱政府干预。公司内部所有者缺位造成的监控不力,导致国有资产流失,可以通过国有资产所有者中的部分成员,即本企业职工参与公司治理加以遏制。 The reform of the state-owned assets management system failed to solve the problem of the absence of owners of state-owned assets. After the reform, the “promotion system” of the operators in the state-controlled companies left them without government intervention. Inadequate monitoring due to the absence of internal owners led to the loss of state-owned assets, which could be checked through the participation of some employees of the state-owned assets, that is, employees of the enterprise in the governance of the company.