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政府干预是一把双刃剑，经济起飞时期，它可以弥补市场信息不对称的缺陷，降低信贷活动的成本，甚至是提高信贷配置的效率；但政府干预并不是无条件、无成本的，其作用前提逐步削弱时，政府往往以强制合同的形式实施干预，强制合同收益与风险不平衡的分摊机制通常会加剧金融机构的道德风险与逆向选择，形成比内生信贷风险更高比例的信贷风险--超额信贷风险。
Government intervention is a double-edged sword. During the economic take-off period, it can make up for the shortcomings of market information asymmetry, reduce the cost of credit activities and even improve the efficiency of credit allocation. However, government intervention is not unconditional and costless, and its role When the premise is gradually weakened, the government often intervenes in the form of compulsory contracts. The sharing mechanism that enforces contractual returns and risk imbalances usually aggravates the moral hazard and adverse selection of financial institutions and forms a credit risk with a higher proportion than the endogenous credit risk - Excess credit risk.