“公务员热”是对近年来数量不断攀升的择业者通过参加国家考试的形式优先选择公共部门就业现象的一种指称。“公务员热”现象的存在不仅事关个人的职业选择,而且关系到社会人力资源的合理配置,更关系到公共权力的边界确定及如何行使的问题。以交易成本理论为视角和分析框架,对择业者因公私部门的选择不同而导致的交易成本差异入手,对形成“公务员热”的内在机理进行解析,可以得出这样的结论:个人的选择理性应当受到尊重,但问题的关键不在于“公务员热”是否得到消解,而在于公共权力是否能够得到实质性的约束。 “Civil servants’ hot” is a type of allegation that the number of job-seekers who have been climbing in recent years has been giving priority to public-sector employment through participation in State examinations. The existence of civil servant fever not only concerns the choice of individual career, but also relates to the rational allocation of social human resources, and more to the determination of the boundary of public power and how to exercise it. From the perspective of transaction cost theory and analysis framework, we begin with analyzing the difference of transaction costs caused by the different choice of public and private sectors, and analyzing the internal mechanism of forming “civil servant’s hot”, we can conclude that individual The choice of rationality should be respected, but the crux of the matter lies not in whether “civil servant fever” is to be resolved, but rather whether public power can be materially bound.