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近期在全国陆续上演着拉闸限电,其根本原因是为了节能减排指标的最后冲刺,低碳政策又一次在执行过程中被异化,低碳政策的执行陷入中央制定政策与地方应用对策的博弈困境。从本质上来看,中央政府与地方政府间的利益博弈从根本上促成了低碳政策的不成功。本文以低碳政策中的节能减排为例,运用博弈论工具分析中央政府与地方政府的决策过程及博弈结果,探究低碳政策执行异化的机理,探求提高低碳政策执行效力的对策。
Recently, staged power cuts have been staged in the country one after another. The fundamental reason for this is that the low-carbon policy has been alienated in the implementation process, and the implementation of low-carbon policies has fallen into the formulation of policies by the central government and local countermeasures Game dilemma. In essence, the game of interest between the central government and local government has fundamentally contributed to the unsuccessful low-carbon policy. Taking the example of energy saving and emission reduction in low carbon policy, this paper uses game theory tools to analyze the decision making process and game results of central and local governments, explores the mechanism of alienation of low carbon policies, and explores ways to improve the effectiveness of low carbon policies.