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从笛卡尔的“我思”而开始确立的近代哲学认识论中的主体性原则,通过排除身体经验的不确定性从而达到一个纯粹自身给予的意识主体,并进而以对象化的方式将世界客观化,在忽略身体体验的同时也将感性世界平面化,使之失去存在之深度和原初呈现的意义。本文试图对造就认识主体的“反思”规定进行深入剖析,指出其内在机制的局限性,并通过引入梅洛-庞蒂的融被动性与主动性于一体的身体视角,表明体验对于反思的优先性,因而从认识主体返回身体主体就使“主体性”获得了更为丰富和全面的内涵。
The principle of subjectivity in modern epistemology of philosophy of philosophy, which began with Descartes’s “I think”, reached a purely self-conscious body of consciousness by excluding the uncertainty of body experience, and in turn objectifies the world Objectifying, while ignoring the experience of the body, also flattens the perceptual world so that it loses its depth and original meaning. This article attempts to make an in-depth analysis of the “reflection ” provisions that make the subject of cognition, points out the limitation of its intrinsic mechanism, and through the introduction of Melo-Ponty’s passive and proactive body perspective, Therefore, returning from the main body of cognition to the main body of the subject makes the “subjectivity” get a richer and more comprehensive connotation.