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财政转移支付的再分配功能有助于均衡地区间公共品的供给能力,但转移支付与地方税收的替代性也可能抑制地方政府的征税积极性。利用我国1999-2011年间的分省区面板数据,本文实证考察了转移支付对地方政府税收行为的影响,研究发现:转移支付总体上会抑制地方征税积极性;地方征税行为选择存在显著的策略替代特征;目前地区间财政竞争策略依然主要表现为税收优惠竞争。本文的研究意味着,规范地方政府的征税行为,不仅是要营造一个严格遵从税法的社会环境,还应优化转移支付制度实施中的激励机制。
The redistributive function of fiscal transfers helps to balance the supply of public goods in different regions, but the substitution of transfer payments and local taxes may also inhibit the tax incentives of local governments. Using the panel data of provinces and autonomous regions from 1999 to 2011 in our country, this paper empirically examines the impact of transfer payment on the tax behavior of local governments. The study finds that transfer payments generally inhibit the enthusiasm of local tax collection, and there is a significant strategy for local tax behavior selection Substitution characteristics; the current inter-regional fiscal competition strategy is still mainly manifested in preferential tax competition. The research in this paper means that to standardize the taxation behavior of local governments is not only to create a social environment strictly complying with the tax law, but also to optimize the incentive mechanism in the implementation of the transfer payment system.