布伦塔诺在《经验立场出发的心理学》中所持的形而上学态度通常被认为是形而上学实在论。本文提出另一种解释,依据这种观点,布伦塔诺始终是一位成熟的现象论者。然而,他的现象论与标准的现象论有着显著的不同,后者并不否认物理学家关于客观世界判断的真实性。在本文中,我将论证,意向性理论的目标,是允许在现象论者理论框架内对外在-现象的关涉(aboutness)的。 Brentano’s metaphysical attitude toward “psychology in the position of experience” is often regarded as metaphysical realism. This article proposes another explanation, according to which Brentano has always been a mature phenomenonist. However, his phenomenology is remarkably different from the standard phenomenology, which does not deny the authenticity of physicists’ judgment about the objective world. In this paper, I will argue that the goal of intentionality theory is to allow about the external-phenomenon within the theoretical framework of the phenomenan.